OFFIC. OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

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(Translation)

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REPORT OF FINNISH NAVAL ATTACHE TO HIS HEADQUARTERS:

"I met with General ONODERA today who has just returned from a ten-day trip to Norway. Concerning our conversation the following:

Germany has not reduced her forces in Norway.
General Onodera considered this quite reliable, relating among other things that he had seen at FALKENHORST'S G.H.Q. a table of the dispersement of German forces (of 13 divisions and 1 brigade) and on the basic of this considered the Swedish reports of movements of German troops, for instance to Denmark, as groundless.

Among other things, General Onodera had had an opportunity to see the German submarine base at Trondheim. At that time there were 9 submarines in a bomb-proof shelter. There had been under construction a new larger concrete shelter, which, when completed, General Onodera estimated that 25 submarines could be housed in the concrete shelters at Trondheim. When General Onodera visited at Narvik there had been 6 submarines at Narvik there

General Onodera's inquiry as to whether this color was a result of some insulation layer designed to prevent radio—location, and in general directing the discussion to preventative devices against radio—location, the Germans admitted that they had no effective counter measure for the prevention of radio—location and that nothing new had been invented along this line.

During the trip there had been considerable discussion about Allied air raids into Norway. The air raids are regularly carried out from aircraft carriers. The following aircraft carriers have been ascertained to have participated in the operations: "SEAFIRE", "CORSAIR", "FAIREY FULMAR", and "VISCOUNT TELCAT" (probability of error in the names). These have been principally base vessels for fighter planes. Two types have chiefly participated in the torpedo and bombing attacks: AVENGER and BARRACUDA. Concerning features of these planes General Onodera mentioned the following:

AVENGER: 3 place, American torpedo and bomber, speed 435 kilometers per hour, operative radius 640 km., 1 torpedo or 900 kg. of bombs (according to information which I received from the Swedes the speed is from 350 to 500 km. per hour, total flight range 2300 km., about 1,000 kg. bombs). Armament consists of one 12.7 mm. machine gun and two moveable 7.6 mm. machine guns.

BARRACUDA:

BARRACUDA: 3 place, British torpedo and bomber, single motor, speed 450-490 km. per hour, operative radius 440-500 km. one 680 kg. torpedo or a corresponding weight in bombs. Armsment consists of one double machine gun. The plane is equipped with radio-locater devices (according to the Swedes the plane is a dive-bomber).

Concerning the tactics employed by the Allies, General Onodera said that the fighters do not accompany the bomber and torpedo planes when these go to offensive operations, rather that the fighters stay behind for the protection of the carrier and remain in the air during the entire time of the operations, for which reason it is difficult for the Germans to get at the carriers. According to General Onodera, all the invasion tonnage which is in England at the present moment is on the south east coast (mostly in the vicinity of the mouth of the Thames). The tonnage available is approximately 3.2 million gross tons. This has been divided into 4 groups of which I and 3 were used in the invasion into Normandy. The Germans do not expect a new landing far from the present bridgehead, rather into its immediate vicinity (between the SEINE and SOMME). For the defense of England itself there have been left for the present: 3 infantry divisions in Scotland, and in mid-Ingland 4 infantry divisions, 1 parachute division, and 1 panzer division. As to the dispersal of naval defense forces it is known that in north English waters there is 1 battleship, the carrier FURIOUS, 1 auxiliary carrier, and 3 larger war vessels (probably 1 battleship and 2 heavy cruisers). It is known that the base at MORAY FIRTH is entirely empty of vessels at present (also of landing craft). In the south English waters (South Wales), there is the battleship IRON DUKE, 2 light cruisers, and 4 smaller war vessels.

Concerning the situation on the Eastern Front from the German viewpoint, General Onodera was quite pessimistic stating that he knows that the Germans are forced to continued withdrawals, concerning which there already are supposed to be preparations under way, in Estonia, for instance (the withdrawal there would occur in a north-westerly direction terminating at DAGO and OSEL, which it is presumed the Germans intend to hold).

In conclusion, I must remark yet that during the conversation General Onodera made some comments which could be interpreted that perhaps the Russo-German peace feelers previously mentioned are under way." +

Note: made the above as his official report to his G.H.Q. He does not know that I have had access to this secret official document.